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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4309
China is increasing its outlay on research and 
development and seeking to build an innovation system 
that will deliver quick results not just in absorbing 
technology but also in pushing the technological 
envelope. China’s spending on R&D rose from 1.1 
percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.3 percent of GDP in 2005. 
On a purchasing power parity basis, China’s research 
outlay was among the world’s highest, far greater than 
that of Brazil, India, or Mexico. Chinese firms are 
active in the fields of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, 
alternative energy sources, and nanotechnology. This 
surge in spending has been parallel by a sharp increase 
in patent applications in China, with the bulk of the 
patents registered in the areas of electronics, information 
technology, and telecoms. However, of the almost 50,000 
This paper—a product of the Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to analyze 
innovation systems in East Asia. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at syusuf@worldbank.org.  
patents granted in China, nearly two-thirds were to 
nonresidents.
   This paper considers two questions that are especially 
important for China. First, how might China go about 
accelerating technology development? Second, what 
measures could most cost-effectively deliver the desired 
outcomes? It concludes that although the level of 
financing for R&D is certainly important, technological 
advance is closely keyed to absorptive capacity which is 
a function of the volume and quality of talent and the 
depth as well as the heterogeneity of research experience. 
It is also a function of how companies maximize the 
commercial benefits of research and development, 
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Shahid Yusuf is an economic advisor and Kaoru Nabeshima a consultant to the Development Research 
Group of the World Bank. Introduction 
In less than 20 years, China mastered a broad range of codified industrial 
technologies to become the world’s leading manufacturer of mass-produced goods. By 
2006 China had become the fourth-largest economy in the world and the third-largest 
trading nation.  
China is now aiming higher, preparing to compete with the industrial frontrunners 
on the basis of industrial production capability in more complex products and services as 
well as on the basis of industrial innovation and design in a number of fields. To 
telescope the time needed to achieve this objective, China is increasing its outlays on 
research and development (R&D) and seeking to build an innovation system that will 
deliver quick results. China’s spending on R&D rose from 1.1 percent of GDP in 2000 to 
1.3 percent of GDP in 2005. In absolute terms the growth was even more impressive, 
because national product increased by an average annual rate of over 9 percent during 
this period. On a purchasing power parity basis, China’s research outlay was among the 
world’s highest, far greater than that of Brazil, India, or Mexico (UNCTAD 2005).
1  
With competitiveness keyed ever more closely to innovation, a progressive 
upgrading of technology is viewed as a necessity by firms in many industries. In China’s 
case, accelerating the development of technology is acquiring urgency because returns on 
existing product lines are being squeezed by rising costs and a massive expansion in 
industrial capacity, both in China and worldwide (Ma, Nguyen, and Xu 2006).
2 By 
strengthening technological capabilities, Chinese firms can lessen their dependency on 
foreign sources and raise profit margins. Investing more in technology also will enable 
China to progressively reduce the energy and resource coefficients of its GDP, and offset 
an anticipated trend increase in the relative prices of these commodities.
3
While the advantages of assimilating, applying, incrementally refining and 
contributing to the march of ever-more complex technologies are obvious, several issues 
remain to be resolved. Two questions are particularly important for China. First, what is 
                                                 
1 How some of this money is being spent on state of the art laboratories is described in “China Supersizes 
its Science” (2007). 
2 Schott (2006) finds that even though China’s exports rank third in the degree of overlap with OECD 
countries, the prices it receives have been declining over time relative to OECD prices. 
3 China’s research effort in the areas of space and defense technologies, as well as cooperative programs 
with the  Brazil, the European Union, and Israel, are described in Sigurdson (2005). 
  2the feasible pace of technology development and, in particular, the scope for pushing the 
technology frontier outward in a few important scientific fields with the potential for 
significant industrial spillovers? Second, at China’s current level of development, what is 
the mix of policy initiatives that will cost-effectively deliver the desired rate of progress? 
 
Acquiring Manufacturing Capabilities 
To begin answering these questions, one must look first at China’s current 
industrial system and the underlying technological capability. By all accounts, China’s 
industrial base is exceptionally broad. This is in part the result of the industrial strategy 
initiated in the 1950s, which aimed at achieving a measure of self-sufficiency in a wide 
range of capital and consumer goods. Guided by this strategy, China built up a 
geographically dispersed base of heavy industries and, in the 1970s, began investing 
substantially in manufacturing capacity for light consumer items, farm equipment, and 
electronics in rural and urban areas. Although during the 1980s, China lagged behind 
some of its industrializing neighbors, several decades of investment helped create a 
diversified industrial system, a large pool of engineering and production line skills, and a 
fund of “learning” from building, running, and maintaining manufacturing facilities by 
drawing mainly on domestic resources only as Japan and Korea had done earlier. 
Since 1980, when China’s “open door” policy began integrating China with the 
global economy, the country’s capabilities have been extensively augmented by 
importing plant and equipment embodying new technologies; by licensing industrial 
technology; by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI); through the circulation of 
knowledge workers, mainly Chinese trained abroad, who have become an important 
conduit for technology transfer; and more recently, through the help of domestic R&D. In 
its effort to strengthen industry, China has been aided by two closely related trends. First, 
because of the maturing of certain technologies and the parallel growth of consumer 
markets, many manufactures have become standardized commodities. Second, the very 
process of “commodification” has been supported by the codifying of the associated 
technologies, some embedded in equipment, others available from suppliers. These 
changes have made it easier to absorb new production methods and quickly achieve high 
  3levels of efficiency. These developments have also made the production of mass market 
items increasingly mobile globally.  
China has benefited more from these trends than most other countries, because it 
was better prepared to assimilate manufacturing technology, for a number of reasons. 
These included the advantages of a potentially huge domestic market, the early as well as 
successful penetration of foreign markets in light manufactures, both of which 
encouraged investment in capacity, and the rapid increase in workers with secondary and 
tertiary education. Export-led growth was greatly aided by the flow of FDI, as firms in 
Hong Kong (China) and other neighboring economies shifted production facilities to take 
advantage of China’s low-wage industrial workforce and establish a foothold in the 
Chinese market (Berger and Lester 1997). As a result of the transfer of hard and soft 
technologies aided by the growth of human capital, industrial capability has grown by 
leaps and bounds, facilitated by the elastic supply of rural workers to China’s burgeoning 
industrial cities in strategic locations along the east coast. The buildup has been supported 
by rising investment in urban, transport, and energy infrastructure, which has helped 
sustain China’s cost advantage, making it the workshop of the world for a range of mass- 
produced goods. 
To what extent is this remarkable achievement related to technological capability 
and innovation? China has clearly demonstrated a knack for absorbing and harnessing 
codified technologies far in excess of other industrializing countries. It has also invested 
heavily in fixed plant, which has lowered the average age of equipment to 7 years 
(compared with 17 years in the United States) (Boston Consulting Group 2006). At the 
same time, the number of science and technology workers rose sharply, from 755,000 in 
1998 to 1.2 million in 2004 (Shang 2005).  
The speed with which China has imitated technologies and mastered production 
skills has been impressive. However, the degree of innovativeness has been limited. This 
is most clearly apparent from the composition of China’s major manufactured exports 
and the nature of the commercial innovations associated with China’s leading companies. 
Computers and peripherals, storage devices, electronic components, other office 
equipment, consumer electronics, textiles, toys, and footwear make up a large share of 
China’s major exports (Table 1). By 2005 China was the world’s largest exporter of 
  4information and communication technology–based products, and close to one-third of its 
exports were classified as “high-tech.” Although the domestic value added in the mature 
electronic products subsector (which includes cathode ray tube TVs and refrigerators) is 
rising steadily as more components are sourced domestically, indigenous technology 
inputs are relatively insignificant. The manufacture of computers and office equipment 
still largely involves the assembly of imported components or locally produced ones 
based on foreign technologies.  
 
Table 1: China’s Top 25 Exports, 2004  
Harmonized code 
1988–92 (6 digit level) 
Share of China’s 
total exports  Description 
Parts and accessories of automatic data-processing 
machines  847330  4.0 
847120  Digital automatic data-processing machines  4.0 
847192  Input or output units  4.2 
852520 Transmission  apparatus  3.1 
852990  Parts for radio/TV transmission/receive equipment, nes  2.3 
854211  Monolithic integrated circuits, digital  1.9 
847193  Computer data storage units  1.5 
Video recording or reproduction apparatus not magnetic 
tape  852190  1.5 
901380  Optical devices, appliances  1.4 
Video recording or reproducing apparatus, magnetic 
tape  852110  1.2 
852810 Color  television receivers/monitors/projectors  1.2 
860900 Cargo  containers  1.1 
850440 Static  converters,  nes  0.9 
852290  Parts and accessories of recorders except cartridges  0.9 
271000  Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except crude  0.9 
270400  Coke, semi-coke of coal, ignite, peat & retort carbon  0.9 
853400 Printed  circuits  0.9 
640399  Footwear, sole rubber, plastics, uppers of leathers, nes  0.9 
847199  Automatic data processing machines and units, nes  0.9 
270112  Bituminous coal, not agglomerated  0.8 
640299  Footwear, other soles/uppers of rubber or plastics, nes  0.8 
420212 Trunks,  suitcases, etc, outer surface plastic/textile  0.8 
847191  Digital computer CPU with some of storage/input/output  0.8 
851999  Sound reproducing apparatus, non-recording, nes  0.7 
611030  Pullovers, cardigans, etc. of man-made fiber, knit  0.7 
 Total  38.4 
Source: UN COMTRADE data obtained through WITS system.  
 
Early innovations by companies such as Stone, Founders, and Lenovo enabled 
computers to use Chinese characters through additional hardware, such as add-on cards 
  5or printers, and word-processing software (Lazonick 2004; Lu and Lazonick 2001).
4 
Although Lenovo and Tsinghua Tongfang, for example, have substantial research 
programs, they have yet to emerge as leaders in their focal product groups. Huawei and 
ZTE— arguably the most innovative of China’s firms—are now able to match their 
foreign competitors in the optical networking, midrange router market, and second-
generation telecoms market, and they are trying to develop homegrown third-generation 
technologies (Sigurdson 2005; "The Trouble" 2006).  
Chinese firms are active in the fields of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, 
alternative energy sources, and nanotechnology.
5 They are registering patents, but so far 
the development of new commercial technologies remains at an early stage. Although 
there has been a surge in the level of patent applications in China (to more than 130,000 
in 2004), the bulk of patents registered are in electronics, information technology, and 
telecoms (Table 2), and almost half were filed by nonresidents. Of the almost 50,000 
patents granted in China, nearly two-thirds were to nonresidents (WIPO 2006). China 
ranked fourth in the world in 2004 patents granted by the national agency, after the 
United States, Japan, and the European patent office (WIPO 2006). 
These statistics need to be treated with caution, because patenting in a number of 
fields is to a substantial degree motivated by the desire of firms to accumulate large 
patent portfolios, often of limited value, to use as bargaining chips in dealing with their 
competitors (Ziedonis and Hall 2001). Newer firms sometimes register patents as a 
signaling device to establish their viability (and attract funding), even if the “new” 
knowledge content and innovation is minor (Hall 2006a).
6 The explosion of patents in the 
United States in the 1980s occurred partly for these reasons. The more recent rates of 
patenting in the life sciences and in software represent changing practices among U.S. 
academic scientists and not necessarily a significant broadening of technological 
                                                 
4 The initial focus of innovation and research efforts in China in the late 1970s was on simplifying the 
printing of Chinese materials. At that time, computers were unable to represent or print thousands of 
Chinese characters. Printing was still done using lead typesetting, which required workers to select each 
character manually from a shelf of thousands of Chinese characters (Lazonick 2004; Lu and Lazonick 
2001). This process was labor intensive and repetitive; computerization greatly enhanced productivity. 
5 The possibility of introducing fuel cell based cars on a mass scale is being considered in Shanghai. 
6 According to Hall (2006a: 5), “the survey evidence from a number of countries shows rather conclusively 
that patents are not among the important means to appropriate returns to innovation, except perhaps in 
pharmaceuticals.” Most patents are never cited or worked on; for the leading U.S. universities, the top five 
patents (usually biomedical ones) account for two-thirds of their patent-related revenue (Mowery 2006). 
  6possibilities (Branstetter and Ogura 2005; Graham and Mowery 2004; Hall 2005; Hall 
2006b; Hunt 2006). Sanyal and Jaffe (2004) find that the increase in patents can also be 
traced to a lowering of examination standards in the United States and overseas. While 
rising levels of patent litigation reflect changes in the judicial system which makes it 
easier to assert or defend intellectual property.
7  
 
Table 2: Number of Patents Filed by and Granted to Chinese Companies  
Number of 
international 
patents granted  Company Sector 
Number of domestic 
patents
a
Huawei Telecommunications  equipment  4,618  78 
Haier Electronics  2,790  32 
ZTE Telecommunications  equipment 1,865  8 
Lenovo Information  technology  1,665  0 
Bao Steel  Steel  403  0 
Tsinghua Tongfang  Information technology  324  1 
VIMICRO Information  technology  316  0 
FAW Automobile  253  0 
Chery Automobile  231  0 
Foundertech Information  technology  146  0 
SMIC Information  technology  157  0 
CDTT Telecommunications  equipment  132  0 
Langchao Information  technology  115  1 
TCL Electronics  86  6 
Source: Ma, Nguyen, and Xu 2006. 
a. Number of domestic patents includes patents granted and patent applications filed and released 
(published) by the government patent office. 
 
Chinese companies have been unusually swift in mastering production 
technologies by leveraging latent capacities nurtured before 1980. However, China’s 
technology capability is in the normal range given its stage of development. China is 
ascending the technology ladder, by absorbing technology from more advanced 
countries; by all accounts, it is doing better than its rivals in Southeast Asia. Can the time 
spent in catching up be shortened significantly? If so, how and at what cost?  
 
International Experience with Technological Change 
                                                 
7 The surge in IT related patenting and the increasing frequency with which patent infringement is 
becoming the basis of threatened or actual legal action has aroused much concern because it threatens 
innovation and raises its costs (Jaffe and Lerner 2006). A recent supreme court decision in the U.S. points 
to a raising of the bar on patents and an attempt to contain costly legal battles. 
  7Empirical evidence indicates that the returns from R&D investments can be 
handsome. Indeed, private returns can average 28 percent, while social returns can be as 
high as 90-100 percent. The elasticities of total factor productivity with respect to R&D 
range from 0.03 to 0.38, with higher rates in the United States than in Europe or Japan 
(Wieser 2005).  
Whether and how China can attain these outcomes is an open question, which can 
be partially illuminated by examining the experience of a few countries.
8 Comparators 
can be divided into three groups: large industrial countries, such as the United States, 
Japan, and Germany, that are innovative and leading exporters of complex manufactures; 
smaller industrial economies that have attained notable levels of innovation in key 
industries, including Finland, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, and Taiwan (China); 
and large industrializing countries, such as Brazil and India, that have become globally 
competitive producers of a limited range of manufacturers and services through the 
acquisition of specific technological expertise. 
 
Lessons from Large, Leading Exporting Countries 
Several lessons of relevance to China today can be drawn from the experience of 
these countries. The first is that the breadth and technological eminence of the United 
States, Japan, and Germany has been built up over a century or more, through the 
combined efforts and investments of the business sector, the government, and the co-
evolution of variety of research and teaching institutions (Mazzoleni 2005). The business 
sector—in particular, large “anchor” firms—has increasingly taken the lead, through 
investment in research and even greater spending on development.
9 However, in the 
United States and to a lesser extent Japan and Germany, the government’s technology 
and education policies, through a variety of programs, many undertaken collaboratively 
with the private sector, has been critical for technology development; at varying times 
and to varying degrees, governments have taken the lead in pushing technological 
                                                 
8 A recent RAND Corp. assessment classifies China as the only one among the industrializing economies 
with the best chance of implementing the top 16 technology applications (Silberglitt and others 2006). 
However, barriers to catching-up remain as described by Wang  (2006). 
9 In Silicon Valley, firms such as Lockheed, Hewlett-Packard, Varian, and General Electric were the initial 
anchor firms (Adams 2005; Agrawal and Cockburn 2003; Lecuyer 2005). 
  8development, both generally and in specific areas. The success of corporate and 
government efforts has depended on the supply of trained and talented people from and 
the research conducted by universities and research centers (Mowery 2005). The creation 
of intermediary institutions—ranging from regional business networks and Fraunhofer 
Institutes (in Germany) to providers of risk capital, such as the Small Business Innovation 
Research program (in the United States)—has helped bridge the information gap between 
universities and businesses. In each of these three countries, tertiary-level institutions for 
training, research, and technological intermediation carry the imprint of government 
policy.  
In the context of these three quite different countries, the aspects that arguably 
deserve emphasis include 
•  The strong impetus for innovation and the institutional framework provided by 
national and subnational governments, backed by direct funding of research, fiscal 
and other incentives, the creation of intermediary organizations, and the 
procurement of products or services; 
10 
•    The lead taken by major companies (e.g. Novartis, Merck, Sun, Philips and 
Google) in developing technologies and, in the process, mobilizing the resources 
of other firms, and the talent in universities;
11  
•  The broad scope of technological development and the reinforcement it provided 
over time—that is, the fact that advances in some sectors pulled advances in 
others, through what Hirschman 1958(1958) labeled “unbalanced growth.” This is 
important, because an effective innovation system requires approximately equal 
performance from all its key parts, something that has been captured by the O-
ring theory (Kremer 1993). Moreover, as increasing numbers of innovations are at 
the intersection of several disciplines, technological capability across subsectors 
and collaboration across industrial boundaries and among firms able to pool 
specific expertise is becoming the key driver of technological change. 
                                                 
10 State-level governments have also been highly active in the United States and Germany (see for example, 
Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt 2006). 
11 The corporate sector is now responsible for the bulk of the research conducted, and corporate research 
activities are conducted on an international scale, in order to fully exploit the knowledge and research 
potential in other countries (Carlsson 2006). 
  9Technological diversification increases patenting by firms and their R&D 
spending while reducing the risks from specialization (Garcia-Vega 2006). In 
many fields, companies are finding that innovations in hardware are insufficient 
without parallel innovation in associated processes and services. Often—as in the 
case of Dell, General Electric, IBM, and other companies—services drive the 
success of products and are the main sources of profit; 
•  Financial instruments and institutions that permitted the entry of innovative new 
firms and the growth of dynamic mid-size ones;  
•  The generation of expertise, which underpins broad technological advance, and 
the support of such expertise with research of comparable scope (a relatively 
small number of universities in key urban centers have provided the foundations 
on which this dynamic technological capability has been built); and  
•  The creation, to varying degrees, of conditions promoting openness to ideas, 
heterogeneity among participants conducting research (increasing in teams), and 
scope for autonomous action; competition among firms, universities, and research 
entities; and urban knowledge networks (“wikicapital”, see Yusuf 2007). 
 
These features were most conspicuous in the United States, which has led in terms 
of innovativeness. However, in all three countries, the maturing of broad technological 
capability has taken close to a century, and it is not apparent that the pace was 
constrained by expenditures on research or technology development.  
 
Lessons from Late-Starting Economies 
Late-starting economies offer another perspective on technological capability that 
is largely consistent with the conditions described above. Brazil, Finland, India, Israel, 
the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan (China) are now ranking members of the rising 
technological elite. Their efforts to build an indigenous innovation system began 
gathering momentum only in the 1970s and the 1980s (Roos, Fernstrom, and Gupta 
2005). In the majority of cases, governments took the initiative in creating tertiary level 
teaching institution and axial research institutes. For example, KAIST (Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology), created in 1981 in the Republic of Korea, and ITRI 
  10(Industrial Technology Research Institute), created in 1973 in Taiwan (China), 
contributed significantly to the strengthening of the technology base. Their efforts were 
complemented by some expansion in tertiary-level enrollment, although research at 
universities, basic or applied, initially received little attention (as was the case in Japan 
and to a lesser extent, Germany). Much of the early efforts were directed toward 
assimilating foreign technologies. Business firms, whether private or public, took the lead 
in Brazil, Finland, India, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan (China); in Israel, the state, 
especially defense agencies, played a larger role, as did foreign high-tech firms, which 
tapped the supply of local skills starting in the 1990s.  
A few major firms dominated technology development in these countries. In the 
Republic of Korea, corporations such as Hyundai and Samsung began the shift from 
technology assimilation to new product development and the quest for systematic 
innovation. Nokia in Finland; TSMC, Hon Hai Precision, and Acer in Taiwan (China); 
Embraer and Embraco and some of the agrobusinesses in Brazil all increased their 
spending on technology at this time, in response to international competitive pressures 
reinforced by government incentives for R&D. Engagement with foreign multinationals, 
technology transfer through imports, and global exporting activities contributed to 
technology development, albeit less in Brazil and India than elsewhere. 
From the start of the new millennium, governments in these countries and the 
OECD (incorporated in the Lisbon Agenda of 2000) have begun placing greater emphasis 
on the contribution of technology to industrial competitiveness and growth. Governments 
are committing more resources—public as well as private—to R&D, and they are trying 
to position universities to support these initiatives by improving the quality of the   
education they provide, conducting more research, and developing and commercializing 
technologies through linkages with businesses.
12 Behind these initiatives is a growing 
recognition that a broadening of technological capability through more and better basic 
research and more ambitious programs for developing technologies is vital for growth. 
For countries seeking steady gains in export performance, diversifying the product mix 
and increasing the share of higher-quality items that command premium prices while 
                                                 
12 The European Union, for example, has proposed creating a European Institute of Technology modeled on 
MIT. 
  11exiting from product lines where returns are being squeezed is the strategy promising the 
best returns (Hummels and Klenow 2005). 
One measure of the development of technological capability in these countries 
and on the potential for diversification is provided by the statistics for patents registered 
in the United States between 2001 and 2005. Like articles in refereed scientific journals, 
patents are only a partial indicator of scientific prowess, because many patents are never 
used for any purpose (just as a high fraction of scientific papers are never cited or used to 
advance technology). Patents are also registered by companies for purposes of cross-
licensing and to defend against lawsuits. Although such factors limit the usefulness of 
patent data, the data nonetheless convey a sense of the scale of technology development 
and the areas in which it is most intense.  
By the end of 2006, China ranked 24th in the world in the number of total patents 
granted by the USPTO, with 3,178 patents. For the five years ending in 2006, it ranked 
20th in the world, with 2,053 patents. While these scores represent a significant increase 
over 2001, when China ranked 24
th in the world, patents from China are only now 
beginning to make their presence felt on the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO). 
What is most striking from the USPTO data is the narrow focus of patenting in 
the sample of countries relative to the United States and Japan. For instance, the top 10 
patent classes account for 39 percent of US patents granted to China (Table 3) but just 21 
percent for the United States. The main fields of patent dominance (life sciences and 
semiconductors for the United States, electronic components for Japan) account for much 
less than 10 percent of all patents in these countries (Tables 4 and 5). By comparison, for 
Finland, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan (China), electronics or telecommunications 
account for 30–40 percent of all patents (Tables 6–8). In addition, a small handful of 
firms in each of these economies accounts for one-third to one-half of all patents.
13 In the 
case of China, electronics accounts for close to a quarter of patents (Table 9). Israel also 
shows two areas of concentration—biotech and software (Table 10). In contrast, in 
                                                 
13 Nokia received 24 percent of all patents issued by the USPTO to Finland-based firms. Samsung received 
40 percent and LG 17 percent of all Korean patents. The top 10 patenting organizations accounted for 71 
percent of patents granted to Korea-based organization between 2001 and 2005.  
  12Brazil, which has few patents, the pattern is fairly diffuse, with some bunching in the 
agrotechnology and mining sectors (Table 11). 
 
Table 3: Share of Top 10 Patent Classes in Selected Economies, 2001–05 
Economy Share  (percent) 




Taiwan (China)  37.5 
China 38.5 
Korea, Rep. of  40.0 
Finland 43.3 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (2007). 
 
Table 4: Top 10 Patent Classes by the Residents in the United States, 2001–05 
Number of 
patents granted 
Share of patent 
class (percent)  Class Class  Title 
Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions  
424  (includes Class 514)  18,203  4.3 
438  Semiconductor Device Manufacturing: Process  11,604  2.8 
435  Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology  10,382  2.5 
Active Solid-State Devices (e.g., Transistors, Solid-
State Diodes)  257  7,856  1.9 
128  Surgery (includes Class 600)  7,276  1.7 
370 Multiplex  Communications  7,064  1.7 
Synthetic Resins or Natural Rubbers 
520  (includes Classes 520-528)  7,029  1.7 
428  Stock Material or Miscellaneous Articles  6,463  1.5 
532  Organic Compounds (includes Classes 532-570)  6,255  1.5 
Multicomputer Data Transferring 
(Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems)  709  5,071 1.2 
 Total    20.7 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (2007). 
 
 
  13Table 5: Top 10 Patent Classes by the Residents in Japan, 2001–05 
Number of 
patents granted 
Share of patent 
class (percent)  Class Class  Title 
Active Solid-State Devices 
 (e.g., Transistors, Solid-State Diodes)  257  7,367 4.4 
438  Semiconductor Device Manufacturing: Process  5,920  3.5 
428  Stock Material or Miscellaneous Articles  5,032  3.0 
347  Incremental Printing of Symbolic Information  4,062  2.4 
Synthetic Resins or Natural Rubbers 
(includes Classes 520-528)  520  3,805 2.2 
359  Optics: Systems and Elements  3,715  2.2 
365  Static Information Storage and Retrieval  3,437  2.0 
Computer Graphics Processing and Selective Visual 
Display Systems  345  3,348  2.0 
Radiation Imagery Chemistry: Process, Composition, 
or Product Thereof  430  3,340  2.0 
399 Electro  photography  3,323  2.0 
 Total    25.6 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (2007). 
 
Table 6: Top 10 Patent Classes by the Residents in Finland, 2001–05 
Number of 
patents granted 
Share of patent 
class (percent)  Class Class  Title 
455 Telecommunications  563  13.9 
370 Multiplex  Communications  329  8.1 
162  Paper Making and Fiber Liberation  250  6.2 
375  Pulse or Digital Communications  133  3.3 
379 Telephonic  Communications  111  2.7 
128  Surgery (includes Class 600)  97  2.4 
Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
(includes Class 514)  424  93  2.3 
343  Communications: Radio Wave Antennas  60  1.5 
Synthetic Resins or Natural Rubbers  
520  (includes Classes 520-528)  60  1.5 
532  Organic Compounds (includes Classes 532-570)  57  1.4 
 Total    43.3 









  14Table 7: Top 10 Patent Classes by the Residents in Taiwan (China), 2001–05 
Number of 
patents granted 
Share of patent 
class (percent)  Class Class  Title 
438  Semiconductor Device Manufacturing: Process  3,586  13.2 
Active Solid-State Devices (e.g., Transistors, Solid-
State Diodes)  257  1,521  5.6 
439 Electrical  Connectors  1,496  5.5 
361  Electricity: Electrical Systems and Devices  1,053  3.9 
362 Illumination  645  2.4 
81 Tools  445  1.6 
280 Land  Vehicles  382  1.4 
365  Static Information Storage and Retrieval  357  1.3 
Computer Graphics Processing and Selective Visual 
Display Systems  345  356 1.3 
482 Exercise  Devices  334  1.2 
 Total    37.5 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (2007). 
 
Table 8: Top 10 Patent Classes by the Residents in the Republic of Korea, 2001–05 
Number of 
patents granted 
Share of patent 
class (percent)  Class Class  Title 
438  Semiconductor Device Manufacturing: Process  2,363  11.8 
Active Solid-State Devices (e.g., Transistors, Solid-
State Diodes)  257  1,104  5.5 
365  Static Information Storage and Retrieval  1,000  5.0 
349  Liquid Crystal Cells, Elements and Systems  861  4.3 
313  Electric Lamp and Discharge Devices  521  2.6 
370 Multiplex  Communications  483  2.4 
Computer Graphics Processing and Selective Visual 
Display Systems  345  477 2.4 
455 Telecommunications  432  2.2 
Miscellaneous Active Electrical Nonlinear Devices, 
Circuits, and Systems  327  394  2.0 
369  Dynamic Information Storage or Retrieval  384  1.9 
 Total    40.0 









  15Table 9: Top 10 Patent Classes by the Residents in China, 2001–05 
Number of 
patents granted 
Share of patent 
class (percent)  Class Class  Title 
439 Electrical  Connectors  269  17.0 
Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
424  (includes Class 514)  106  6.7 
361  Electricity: Electrical Systems and Devices  52  3.3 
Catalyst, Solid Sorbent, or Support Therefor: 
502  Product or Process of Making  36  2.3 
435  Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology  28  1.8 
532  Organic Compounds (includes Classes 532-570)  28  1.8 
Synthetic Resins or Natural Rubbers (includes Classes 
520-528)  520  27 1.7 
Active Solid-State Devices (e.g., Transistors, Solid-
State Diodes)  257  23 1.4 
375  Pulse or Digital Communications  21  1.3 
382 Image  Analysis  21  1.3 
 Total    38.5 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (2007). 
 
Table 10: Top 10 Patent Classes by the Residents in Israel, 2001–05 
Number of 
patents granted 
Share of patent 
class (percent)  Class Class  Title 
Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
(includes Class 514)  424  334  6.5 
128  Surgery (includes Class 600)  309  6.0 
370 Multiplex  Communications  202  3.9 
375  Pulse or Digital Communications  140  2.7 
382 Image  Analysis  130  2.5 
532  Organic Compounds (includes Classes 532-570)  125  2.4 
435  Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology  116  2.3 
250 Radiant  Energy  109  2.1 
606 Surgery  (instruments)  109  2.1 
385 Optical  Waveguides  95  1.8 
Total   32.4   









  16Table 11: Top 10 Patent Classes by the Residents in Brazil, 2001–05 
Number of 
patents granted 
Share of patent 
class (percent)  Class Class  Title 
62 Refrigeration  30  5.8 
Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
(includes Class 514)  424  19  3.7 
417 Pumps  18  3.5 
Wells (shafts or deep borings in the earth, e.g., for oil 
and gas)  166  13  2.5 
532  Organic Compounds (includes Classes 532-570)  13  2.5 
137 Fluid  Handling  12  2.3 
220 Receptacles  11  2.1 
604  Surgery (Medicators and Receptors)  11  2.1 
403  Joints and Connections  10  1.9 
435  Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology  10  1.9 
 Total    28.3 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (2007). 
 
These data indicate that four of the most technologically dynamic smaller 
economies— Finland, Israel, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan (China)—have fairly 
narrow capabilities, mainly in electronics/telecommunication components of various 
kinds and the life sciences. Limited as it is, this capability took more than 25 years to 
develop, and except in Israel, it resides mainly in a few multinational corporations that 
have production facilities and in some cases research laboratories all over the world. The 
areas of specialization are significant in three respects: they are in the throes of 
technological change; the nature of technologies in these areas prompts companies to 
undertake much patenting, sometimes of relatively minor advances for defensive reasons 
and for purposes of cross-licensing; and the codification of technology and its diffusion is 
fairly rapid, so that the rents from each generation of technology are quite short-lived. 
Several inferences can be drawn from the experience of these countries that 
complement the lessons from the United States, Germany and Japan. One is that 25 years 
may be enough time to build technological capability in only a few areas. This capability 
may not be adequate to support the development of a regularly refreshed and diversified 
mix of products and services. A slowing of the tempo of change, unforeseen 
technological advances, or a migration of key researchers could quickly erode the narrow 
base of capabilities created. 
  17A second inference is that the capability resides mainly in a small number of 
organizations whose headquarters and research facilities are located in a handful of major 
urban centers. Where these organizations are multinational corporations, their longer-
term interests may not coincide with those of their current home country. In a globalizing 
world, it is all too possible to imagine companies moving their primary research activities 
and production facilities overseas. Were a Nokia or a Samsung to shift the bulk of its 
R&D overseas, the technological capability of Finland and the Republic of Korea could 
be seriously impaired, if not immediately, at least over time. 
A third and related inference is that in Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea, and 
even Taiwan (China), research capability in the university sector remains limited; there 
are few institutional foci for cross-disciplinary research or intermediaries to promote the 
commercialization of applied research, although efforts to create them are now ongoing. 
Universities in these countries often lack the faculty, the recruiting policies, and the 
incentives to build balanced expertise across disciplines, including in the social sciences 
and the humanities or to motivate cross-disciplinary work. Additional funding cannot 
easily change staffing patterns, administrative and teaching responsibilities, departmental 
hierarchies, or promotion ladders. And even where larger budgets could help raise the 
salaries of university researchers, which are often low, recruiting staff at the appropriate 
levels, would be a complex undertaking. Attracting and retaining high-quality staff and 
building a fund of experience is a task that can span decades, even if there is a pool of 
national or international skills to tap.  
Should China heed this experience? If so, how might doing so cause it to adapt its 
policies? Given China’s size, its apparent success in mastering manufacturing 
technologies, and its growing supplies of science and technology personnel, the argument 
can be made that given a sufficiently large investment, China could achieve within 
another two decades what took the United States close to a century to put in place.  
 
Accelerating Technological Advance 
It might well be feasible to create sufficient technological capability within a 
decade to close the gap in selected areas of electronics, especially if multinational 
corporations from East Asia and other parts of the world continue shifting their 
  18production and research to China. However, even if the technology gap were closed, 
would China become a significant innovator in specific subfields? The experience of 
Japan suggests that catching up might be the easier part. Becoming a serial innovator is 
far more demanding.  
The trends in innovation and the unpredictable nature of technological change 
argue for broad technological capability spanning many fields, similar to that of the 
United States. China has the size and industrial potential to achieve broad technological 
capability. Doing so, however, is certain to be time consuming, and the pace of progress 
is likely to be determined by the development of significant innovation oriented anchor 
firms in the corporate sector, as well as by basic and applied research at universities, 
research centers, and other institutions. These institutions will determine advances in 
knowledge, influence whether some of this knowledge leads to advances in technology, 
and intermediate the diffusion of this technology, particularly to smaller firms. 
The extent to which a few corporations, universities, research centers, and 
individuals account for a high proportion of innovation says something about the quality 
of researchers. During the “catch-up” phase, having large numbers of science and 
technology personnel to assimilate technology from abroad may be an advantage. In 
contrast, innovation depends largely on the quality of the researchers, the size of the 
research teams, the research environment, the resources at their disposal, researchers’ 
willingness to explore technological possibilities, and in many instances their readiness to 
engage in long-range basic research. In the life sciences and nanotechnology, where 
progress is rooted to advances in basic science, the architects of innovation are the star 
scientists who are experienced managers of research teams and institutes. These men and 
women lead and inspire others but also encourage debate and challenge current 
paradigms. Where new technologies are becoming more closely linked to not just basic 
science but also the enlightened concentration of inputs form several disciplines, the 
quality of the lead researchers and their ability to assemble cross-national and cross-
  19cultural teams takes on even greater significance.
14 Equally important is the readiness to 
focus not just on the fashionable fields but to look beyond at other promising areas. The 
inference is that the return from improvements in quality is rising fast. Trading quality for 
quantity might not be a good policy recipe, but quality is difficult to nurture, takes much 
longer, and is politically less rewarding than expanding tertiary enrollments or 
multiplying the number of research programs. Furthermore, the capacity and resources to 
cover diverse fields of enquiry, several in some depth, can be a major advantage.  
Over the past 20 years, China has initiated a number of programs to promote 
technology development (Table 12). These programs and the many other initiatives 
relating to technology development constitute an impressive and sustained effort to build 
capacity. China’s demonstrated ability to rapidly absorb foreign technology indicates that 
the programs are working.  
At this juncture, there may no longer be a need for national programs to focus on 
the very basic quantitative indicators—such as the number of science and technology 
personnel, the number of papers published in major journals, the level of R&D, the 
number of patents issued—as these are growing robustly and may convey a misleading 
impression of innovativeness (Zhou and Leydesdorff 2006; Sigurdson 2005; WIPO 
2006).
15 Instead, policy effort could now be brought to bear more forcefully on four 
specific areas. In conjunction with ongoing activities, focusing on these areas might make 
a larger contribution to helping China acquire the technological capability that undergirds 
an innovative economy. 
•  Promote R&D in larger corporations, Chinese and foreign, to prepare the ground 
for greater innovativeness, encourage global sourcing of research by the corporate 
sector, and spur the formation of research partnerships and consortia. This is 
ongoing with many foreign companies conducting R&D in China and 
coordinating this with their research (e.g. firms such as Microsoft, Novartis, Intel, 
                                                 
14 Judson (2005) examines the importance of growing a “scientific culture” in China, which can be a slow 
process. Cao (2004) cautions that China may not be able to realize its ambition of winning a Nobel Prize in 
science any time soon, because the gap between China and the West is still wide. Aizenman and Noy 
(2006) show that scientific leadership has lagged increases in GDP and is influenced by wars and 
immigration, particularly in the United States and Germany.  
15 China is emerging as a leader in the field of nanoscience, with a growing list of publications (Zhou and 
Leydesdorff ). 
  20Nokia, Google, SAP, etc.) elsewhere and Chinese firms such as Lenovo and 
Huawei. 
 
Table 12: Major National Programs with Impact on University Research in China 
       
Program  Agency  Year begun  Key focus 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
Spark  1985  Improve agricultural technology and develop 
agro-industrial clusters 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
1998  Develop high-tech industries and 
development zones and provide laboratories 
and equipment 
Torch 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
March 1986  Enhance international competitiveness and 
improve overall capability of R&D in high 











1982  Support applied R&D to meet critical 
technological needs in key sectors 
 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
June 1997  Strengthen basic research in line with 
national strategic targets (primarily in 
agriculture, energy, information, resources 




















Support National Key Laboratories 
Development Program, National Key Science 
Projects Program, and National Engineering 
Technology Research Centers Development 
Program   
National Natural Science 
Foundation 





Ministry of Education  211  1995  Improve overall institutional capacity and 
develop key disciplinary areas in selected 
universities, and develop public service 
system of higher education (three networks) 
Ministry of Education  985  1998 (first 
phase); 
Turn China’s top 150 universities into world-
class research institutions 
2004 (second 
phase) 
Source: Wu 2007; Sigurdson  2005. 
 
•  Enlarge the contribution of key universities to innovation, especially through a 
focus on basic research in a variety of scientific fields. 
•  Create and strengthen intermediary organizations that can help form alliances 
among firms; multiply formal and informal mechanisms of engagement between 
university researchers and firms; increase access to risk capital from venture 
  21capitalists and angel investors; and facilitate the development and 
commercialization of research. 
•  Use urban policies to create the infrastructure and environment needed to 
germinate the social networks—local and international—that induce new 
knowledge creation, and maximize knowledge spillovers, including the exchange 
of tacit knowledge. Despite the shrinking of distance made possible by 
information technology, the geography of innovation remains highly location 
specific. Worldwide, probably no more than two dozen metropolitan areas attract 
and retain some of the most talented researchers and account for a 
disproportionate share of technological advances.  
 
Promoting Research and Development 
Increasing  spending on R&D up to a certain threshold is necessary to build 
technological capacity. How much spending is needed to reach this threshold, how 
quickly it should be attained, and how far beyond the threshold spending should be 
pushed is uncertain.
16  
Fiscal incentives for R&D are widely used in industrial countries and have been 
introduced in China as well.
17 The weight of international empirical evidence suggests 
that they are effective in raising corporate spending on research.  
The tax incentives currently being extended to firms in China are generous by 
international and East Asian standards. They include an exemption of up to 150 percent 
of R&D expenditure from corporate income tax and the provision of carry forward of any 
unutilized amount to offset tax liabilities up to four years in the future. Accelerated 
depreciation allowances permit firms to treat expenditures on equipment worth less than 
                                                 
16 Without a well crafted strategy and a coordinated approach to R&D and the commercialization of 
research outputs, R&D spending does not readily translate into profits (See Jaruzelski, Dehoff, and Bordia 
2005).  
17 On the R&D tax credit, the voluminous body of research is essentially positive: the credit does stimulate 
R&D and increase welfare. However, the gains depend on (a) the design of the instrument (whether it is 
volume based or incremental [which affects deadweight losses], temporary or permanent, complicated or 
simple, subject to a cap; (b) the administrative burden imposed on companies by the claims process; and (c) 
the speed with which firms are reimbursed. A volume-based tax that has no cap, includes extra provisions 
for small and medium-size enterprises that are permanent, and is simple to claim is the most attractive, 
although it does entail higher deadweight losses (see Hall and van Reenen 1999; Bloom, Griffith, and van 
Reenen 2002; and Russo 2004). 
  22Y300,000 as overhead; for more expensive equipment, the depreciation period can be 
shortened to as little as three years. High-tech start-ups pay no income tax for the first 
two years and 15 percent for the next three years (less than half the normal rate of 33 
percent). The reduction can be applied for another three years if the firm remains 
classified as a high-tech enterprise. Companies that incur heavy expenditure on fixed 
investment as a part of their R&D activities will benefit from the switch to a 
consumption-type VAT.
18 Import duty exemptions on equipment for R&D purposes 
further augment earnings. Firms in the biotech, telecom, new materials, aeronautics, 
information technology, and electronics fields derive substantial benefits from such 
preferential tax treatment. 
Tax incentives are complemented by direct central and subnational government 
spending on R&D. Grants by various ministries have reached significant levels and are 
rising faster than revenues. In addition, procurement policies of government agencies are 
designed to favor firms that are designated as innovative. This is especially helpful for 
firms in the telecoms, electronics, automotive, and customized software industries. 
How, at this stage, might these policies be tailored to produce the best results? 
Increased spending on some activities classified for tax purposes as R&D might have low 
social returns, particularly where firms are still mainly in the assimilation stage and 
poorly equipped in terms of strategy, managerial expertise, organizational, design, and 
technical skills to conduct meaningful research or to use research findings for commercial 
purposes.  
These constraints, especially the shortage of seasoned midlevel research 
managers, might argue for tax incentives that encourage the pooling of research effort by 
companies and a variety of alliances. The formation of research consortia might be one 
approach to favor. Joint programs with local or foreign universities might be another. Tax 
incentives could be made particularly generous for joint research programs with foreign 
companies, based on the scale of the foreign involvement and the subsector that is the 
focus of the research. This approach would encourage multinational corporations that 
                                                 
18 VAT rebates on semiconductors offered after June 2000 and amended in 2001 were ended in April 2005 
(Sigurdson 2005). 
  23already benefit from incentives to localize research activities to work more closely with 
Chinese firms.
19
Incentives to offshore some research and engage more closely with researchers 
would recognize the realities of a globalizing research environment. This does not 
undermine the case for strengthening local capacity; it does argue for taking full 
advantage of international research and design capabilities where possible (as 
demonstrated by Brilliance Auto), in the interests of enhancing competitiveness. 
Offshoring research could put pressure on local research entities to improve their own 
performance; international research joint ventures can also be important vehicles for 
technology transfer. In short, as circumstances permit, the fiscally cost-effective approach 
to supporting corporate research at China’s current stage of development might be one 
that stresses pooled effort locally and globally. This approach would recognize that in 
certain cases it may be more efficient to allow Chinese researchers to continue working 
abroad rather than offering them generous incentives to return,
20 only to find what could 
be initially a less productive niche in the local research environment.
21 The approach 
                                                 
19 The contribution of research consortia in Japan has been described by Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998; 
2002). Such consortia have also been created in the Republic of Korea and the United States (see 
Sakakibara and Branstetter 2003; Sakakibara and Cho 2002). Although the results are not as compelling 
with regard to the role of foreign firms in China, Whalley and Xin (2006) find that foreign companies and 
joint ventures that on balance were more capital-, technology-, and skill intensive were responsible for 
nearly 60 percent of exports and close to 40 percent of China’s growth in 2003–04. They were also 
responsible for almost half of all patent applications to China’s patent agency in 2005 and nearly two-thirds 
of all patents granted (WIPO 2006). 
20 The Chinese government provides financing for researchers willing to return to China to work for up to 
one year in areas outside their selected fields. These activities include joining research programs sponsored 
by the state, ministries, or provincial governments; helping domestic institutions solve key scientific issues; 
and giving lectures and conducting training, attending international conferences or important national 
meetings, and assisting in technology transfer and technical exchanges. The sponsorship consists of 
international travel and living allowances. The Chunhui program has sponsored 8,000 Chinese scholars 
with PhD degrees obtained overseas who returned to China to carry out short-term work. The Yangtze 
River Fellowship program awarded 537 overseas Chinese scholars appointments in Chinese universities for 
curriculum building, teaching, and joint academic research. China also established overseas student 
business bases or industrial parks, organized jointly by the central and provincial governments to help 
returned overseas students start up businesses in China. The central and provincial governments share the 
expenses of building infrastructure and other facilities and providing services as required for business 
environment (http://www.moe.gov.cn; http://www.mop.gov.cn). 
21 Of the 300 scientists of Chinese origin who are recognized as leaders in their fields, only 5 have returned 
to China (Cao ). While the research environment in China is changing, seniority is a paramount criterion in 
decision making, and junior scientists are often unwilling to challenge their mentors or elders, according to 
Cao. 
  24would also benefit from a further strengthening of the institutions protecting intellectual 
property, especially the courts.  
Are new firms a significant source of technology advances? The evidence is 
stronger for the biotech, software, and telecom/electronic components subsectors than for 
others, and much of the evidence comes from the United States. Fewer data from East 
and South Asian economies support this position. In India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
and other Asian countries, larger firms are clearly more innovative than smaller ones. 
Nevertheless, a scheme comparable to the Small Business Innovation Research program 
in the United States, which targets firms with promising technologies, could increase the 
flow of innovation from smaller firms by supplementing the venture capital that is 
already available from government sources and the private sector. 
 
Supporting Universities and Creating Linkages with Businesses 
Although the primary locus of technology development and innovation is 
generally the business sector, the building of capability hinges on the talent produced by 
and the mix of research conducted at universities. The leading Western and Japanese 
universities, a few of which are at the forefront of science and technology development, 
went through a lengthy gestation period, during which they devised, tested, and refined 
curricula and pedagogic techniques and established reputations as centers of excellence 
for higher education. Among these larger universities, many have strengthened their 
research activities, but the best still view their primary mission as imparting a first-rate 
education in order to prepare the researchers and knowledge workers who will take up the 
challenge of science and technology development. 
For Chinese universities, which are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid expansion 
in enrollment, the issue of quality is central, especially for the leading ones.
22 All Chinese 
universities are adding to their faculties, to the variety of courses they offer, and to their 
physical infrastructure. Some are also entering into or enlarging the scope of their 
research. The hierarchical social organization of many departments, which often defines 
the content of teaching and research, is a major issue. Recruiting a sufficiently diverse 
                                                 
22 China had more than 1,000 colleges and universities in 2004, several hundred of which offered graduate 
courses. Total enrollment was 14 million. The target for 2010 is enrollment of 30 million (Sigurdson 2005). 
  25junior faculty, from across the country and overseas, with the requisite expertise and 
skills and bringing them up to speed is a second. Striking an appropriate balance between 
teaching and research is a third. It may be a decade or more before these issues are 
satisfactorily resolved. During this period, and possibly beyond, it would be desirable to 
proceed cautiously with applied research programs aimed at developing commercial 
technologies and establishing linkages with the business sector. While the leading U.S. 
universities often conduct research that is a precursor of commercial technologies and 
university researchers collaborate with their corporate counterparts, even the likes of 
MIT, Stanford, and the Universities of California are responsible for only a tiny 
percentage of total patents and spin-offs, and companies in the United Kingdom and the 
United States give a low ranking to contacts with universities as a source of commercial 
innovations (Hughes 2007; Lester 2005). Net income from licensing, royalties, and spin-
offs represents just a small fraction of the research budgets of these universities (Mowery 
2007).  
By some measures, Chinese universities have edged past their U.S. counterparts 
in terms of university-affiliated spin-offs. In 2004, the 600 leading universities had more 
than 4,500 affiliated companies, close to half of which were described as technology 
intensive. A large percentage of these enterprises were created to provide jobs to 
university staff who cannot be laid off, however, and do not represent genuine high-tech 
spin-offs. Universities such as Tsinghua and Beijing apparently derive sizable revenues 
from these business activities, but whether most universities are likely to benefit from 
becoming business conglomerates is uncertain. If they become less specialized and are 
diverted from their core mission, there is a risk that the quality of both teaching and 
research could suffer over time (Dasgupta and David 1994). This dilution of core 
competence is frequently the case in industrial conglomerates when diversification strains 
managerial and organizational capacities. 
Hence, at least over the course of the next decade, fiscal incentives and budgetary 
support could help universities move through the transition phase; build the capability for 
providing a good-quality education that develops creativity; and strengthen the ability of 
the leading universities to pursue basic research in novel directions. The larger 
  26universities need to be encouraged to pursue links with business firms, but commercial 
objectives should not overshadow those of teaching and research. 
 
Establishing Channels for Focusing Research and Diffusing Research Findings 
A consistent finding of many studies of technological development is that 
research conducted at universities and institutes diffuses slowly to the business sector, 
and only a small fraction of this knowledge is ever commercialized.
  23 The main 
beneficiaries are large corporations engaged in in-house research, which are more likely 
to be seeking new technologies, commissioning new work, and licensing it. Small and 
medium-size enterprises benefit far less, because of lack of preparedness or in-house 
absorptive capacity, lack of awareness of research being conducted by universities, and 
the inability or unwillingness to incur the transaction costs of licensing patents or 
harnessing researchers through consulting contracts or other vehicles for cooperation 
(Boschma 2005; Kodama and Suzuki  forthcoming).  
To remedy this diffusion failure, national and subnational governments and 
business associations have crafted mechanisms for creating institutional or organizational 
channels for focusing research efforts and diffusing research findings, especially to small 
and medium-size enterprises. The purpose of these initiatives, of which there are 
numerous examples in North America, Europe, and Asia, is to provide resources for 
priority technologies, to establish networks of firms to circulate new knowledge, and to 
mobilize the research assets of the region and use them more effectively. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, Research Council Centers, Regional Development Agencies, and 
Faraday Partnerships provide such services. The University of California-San Diego’s 
CONNECT program brokers relationships between business firms and researchers. Such 
midwifery is performed by TEKES (the principal agency funding and promoting 
technology) in Finland and by state agencies in India (Basant and Chandra forthcoming).  
A somewhat different but equally valuable input is provided by venture capitalists 
and experienced angel investors. In the United States, angel investors are far more 
important than venture capitalists for early-stage financing ("Giving Ideas Wings" 2006; 
                                                 
23 Adams, Clemmons, and Stephan (2006) review the literature on diffusion from universities and estimate 
that the modal lag period is more than three years. 
  27Branscomb 2004) the two sources of capital are essentially complements. Experience 
suggests that experienced venture capitalists and angel investors with deep knowledge of 
an industry, organizational skills, local knowledge, and many contacts, local and foreign, 
are the most useful. Accumulating such human capital is a function of business successes 
and time, as well as the overall urban environment, including the social environment. 
 
Creating Urban Centers that Attract Innovation Activities 
Innovative activities are largely urban phenomena, localized in relatively few 
urban regions (Hall 2001; Markusen and others 2001; Florida 2002). These centers, 
which host some of the world’s leading universities and research institutes, have attracted 
major anchor firms and have well-developed sources of finance, including sources of risk 
capital. The presence of successful universities, dynamic firms, and multiple sources of 
finance is closely related to urban development strategies that have helped create a 
physical and social environment that is conducive to innovation. 
Physical location and history are often important (as in the cases of Boston or the 
San Francisco Bay Area, for instance), but the maintenance of an urban comparative 
advantage based on technology requires sustained investment in infrastructure, services, 
and institutions. Such development depends on the leadership, fiscal resources, 
organizational skills, and policies of municipal governments, conducted within a 
framework defined by the national authorities. Such a national framework and local 
development initiatives have broader aims than simply stimulating technological 
innovation, but building technological capacity can become a major component of central 
and subnational policies. The central government can promote localized technological 
capability through intergovernmental fiscal measures; targeted research grants; support 
for specific public universities and research institutes; funding for science parks; and 
infrastructure development that pulls in industry and institutions such as those buttressing 
intellectual property that encourage innovation. 
Municipal governments can reinforce these measures and research, as subnational 
governments in the United States have done (Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt 2006). 
Municipalities also play an important role in the creation of science parks, often adjacent 
to research centers, as well in land use policies, which determine housing and commercial 
  28development. From the perspective of technological innovation in a globalizing 
environment, arguably the most important municipal-level actions with significant long-
term fiscal implications are the provision of high-quality public services, social 
amenities, urban transport, and an information technology system, which together with 
efficient regulations influence the attractiveness of an urban center for knowledge-based 
activities. Maintaining and progressively modernizing such services and such 
infrastructure involves a high level of current expenditures. The ability to mobilize the 
needed revenue depends on the elasticity of the local tax system; the adequacy of charges 
and fees for services; the effective division of labor between public and private providers; 
and strong governance, in particular the harnessing of e-governance. 
In China, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Xian are 
among the urban centers that are taking the lead in building urban innovation capability. 
In both Shanghai and Beijing, central and municipal authorities are investing heavily in 
physical infrastructure and services, including science parks and university R&D 
(Sigurdson 2005). The challenge ahead for these and other cities is to achieve and sustain 
a high level of public services. Shanghai, Beijing, Xian, and other cities also need to 
substantially improve their social amenities, particularly recreational amenities and the 
quality of the environment, which remain weak points. Improvements along these lines 
will help attract and retain talented people and dynamic firms. 
If the recent geographical patterns of technological innovation persist, most 
advances in technology will be concentrated in a small number of urban centers. The 
development strategies of China’s leading cities will thus influence the growth and 
distribution of research capabilities, the location decisions of anchor firms, and the 
emergence of links between firms and research institutions.  
 
A Brief Summing Up 
China is determined to achieve technological parity with the front running 
economies and to do so within the next decade or two. Its R&D effort are deployed 
across a broad front ranging from automotive and electronic technologies to high energy 
physics, to space exploration, nuclear energy and consumer product design. The 
government is allocating large sums to research and providing generous incentives to 
  29private firms, domestic and foreign. But as international experience clearly demonstrates, 
financing is only one factor albeit an important one. The productivity of an innovation 
system depends also on the volume of talent, and depth, as well as the heterogeneity of 
experience. Cross country studies show that the creativity of talented people is stimulated 
by society and how companies maximize the commercial benefits from R&D through 
effective strategies, management and coordination of research, production, and 
marketing.  
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